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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
 On February 29, 2020, the Trump Administration signed a deal with the Islamic Emirate 
in Afghanistan, otherwise known as “the Taliban” to remove all United States troops from the 
country by May 1, 2021.1 This agreement was contingent on the Taliban and affiliate leaders 
from the Haqqani Network and Al-Qaeda beginning negotiations with the Afghan government to 
create a power-sharing arrangement where both entities controlled respective portions of the 
government.2 One year later, the Taliban, with the help of the Haqqani Network and Al-Qaeda, 
has increased the number of their attacks to such a degree that Afghanistan is more affected by 
terrorism than any other country, and the Taliban is killing alarming numbers of government 
forces and officials.3 Yet the current plan is still for US troops to exit the country completely, 
and the safety and stability of the Afghan government and its citizens is therefore in serious 
jeopardy.   
 This is a study of how the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Al-Qaeda have used their 
attacks as a communication method to express their dissatisfaction with the Afghan government 
throughout the peace negotiations and their attempt to pressure the US and Afghan governments 
into making the policy decisions they want to see. The study will also discuss the policy options 
the Biden Administration has for potentially organizing an interim government in Afghanistan 
while the country transitions to having the Taliban and current officials serving in positions in 
the government.  Therefore, my main research question is as follows: How have the Taliban, 
Haqqani Network, and Al-Qaeda used their attacks to communicate to the Afghan and US 
                                                          
1 BBC News, “Afghan conflict: US and Taliban sign deal to end 18-year war,” BBC News, February 29, 2020, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51689443  
2 BBC News, “Afghan conflict: US and Taliban sign deal to end 18-year war.” 
3 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2020, (University of Maryland, 2020), 8. 
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governments that they do not agree with the policy decisions throughout the 2020-2021 Afghan 
peace negotiations and how are they responding to the current policy options of the Biden 
Administration? In order to provide an answer, this thesis will utilize the resources of the 
University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the Global Terrorism Index 2020, 
news reports of attacks throughout 2020-2021, and articles that detail Biden’s current options for 
a peace plan.     
 The GTD will be used to study the trends of attacks from the Taliban, Haqqani Network, 
and Al-Qaeda in relation to the targets of attacks, the dates, and the numbers of casualties. It has 
records of hundreds of terrorist attacks by the three groups and 133 entries unique to the Haqqani 
Network as well as attacks it and the Taliban claimed responsibility for from 2006-2018. When 
aligning the instances of attacks to the recent events of the peace negotiations, the aim is to draw 
a correlation between the attacks and decisions made by the US and Afghan governments with 
which the Taliban and its affiliates are dissatisfied. 
Study Outline 
 The first chapter of this thesis will focus on providing a brief history of the relationship 
between the Haqqani Network, Taliban, and Al-Qaeda, the ways in which the three groups are 
connected through leadership, and a literature review on the current sources discussing their 
attack collaborations. The second chapter will lay out the methodology of the research, centered 
on the entries of the GTD, Global Terrorism Index 2020, news sources detailing attacks in 2020 
and 2021, and policy recommendations for the Biden Administration. Next, chapter three will 
reveal the findings from the GTD, the trends that the attacks demonstrate, and the way they relate 
to the trends of attacks in 2020-2021 as communication tools. The fourth chapter will further 
discuss this in relation to the peace plan of the Biden Administration and will recommend the 
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best policy alternative. Finally, the fifth chapter will be the conclusion and will detail the 
significance of this thesis.  
History of Connections Between the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Al-Qaeda 
 The founder of the Haqqani Network was Jalaluddin Haqqani. He was born in 1939 and 
was from Paktia, Afghanistan. As a young man, he studied at the Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania 
madrassa, an Islamic religious seminary, before he began training to fight against the pro-Soviet 
regime in Afghanistan, which was led by Mohammed Daoud Khan.4 Jalaluddin received support 
from Pakistan throughout his training and became a leader amongst the mujahideen in the 1980s, 
quickly gaining the loyalty and support of many other mujahideen “soldiers.”5 After the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, he opened fundraising offices to begin gathering donations for his 
network. At the same time, Jalaluddin focused on recruiting a number of Arab fighters who were 
sympathetic to the cause of jihad against the Soviet Union, which at the time was his main 
concern.6 He believed jihad against the Soviets was the most important goal for all Muslims and 
that the commonality would bring their community together. 
 Through Jalaluddin’s recruitment efforts and collection of funds from wealthy Arab 
donors across Afghanistan, he was able to build bases for his group in Peshawar and Miramshah, 
Pakistan, and in Afghanistan’s Loya Paktia, now one of the main operating bases of the Haqqani 
Network.7 He also established a cave complex in the mountains of Zhawara, in the Khost 
Province of Afghanistan, that now has training centers and provides the Haqqani Network with a 
                                                          
4 Gretchen Peters. Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry. West Point: Combating Terrorism 
Center West Point, July 2012, 14.  
5 Gretchen Peters. Haqqani Network Financing, 15.  
6 Marvin G. Weinbaum and Meher Babbar. The Tenacious, Toxic Haqqani Network. Washington, DC: Middle East 
Institute, September 2016, 3. 
7 Marvin G. Weinbaum and Meher Babbar. The Tenacious, Toxic Haqqani Network, 3. 
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site to store weapons and supplies.8 These bases enabled his fighters to intermingle with one 
another, bringing a variety of men together and broadening their focus from conducting jihad 
against Soviet forces to a wider view. Many of these men were non-Afghan volunteer fighters 
who felt they did not have a purpose or place to go after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Appealing to this demographic was a recruiting technique unique among Taliban-affiliated 
groups, which brought the group some martially talented members.9 
During the invasion of Afghanistan, countries such as the US, China, and Saudi Arabia 
funneled massive amounts of weapons and aid into Afghanistan in support of the insurgency. By 
the mid-1980s, the CIA alone had provided 60,000 tons of weapons and supplies to mujahideen 
commanders.10 Unfortunately, this resulted in many of these weapons ending up in the hands of 
the Haqqani Network, its affiliates such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and even Chinese forces.  
Throughout the period when the Haqqani Network was establishing its bases, Jalaluddin 
began to receive donations and aid from Osama bin Laden, who was impressed with the network 
he created. The Haqqani Network’s ideology influenced bin Laden’s tactics against western 
forces, and its leadership was credited with convincing bin Laden to focus Al-Qaeda’s mission 
on conducting jihad against the “imperial hegemony” of the US.11 Jalaluddin claimed that the US 
had colluded with “Israel to oppress Muslims worldwide” and he pledged allegiance to the 
Taliban in 1996, which made the Haqqani Network an organization under the umbrella of the 
Taliban, but Jalaluddin was able to keep it autonomous enough to claim it as a separate entity 
                                                          
8 Gretchen Peters. Haqqani Network Financing, 16.  
9 Vahid Brown and Don Rassler. Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2013, 60.  
10 Vahid Brown and Don Rassler. Fountainhead of Jihad, 59.  
11 Vahid Brown and Don Rassler. Fountainhead of Jihad, 64.  
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because of the network’s separate business operations.12 After this recognition by Al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban, the Haqqani Network began accepting large donations from Pakistan’s Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI), which gave the Haqqani Network access to billions of dollars as the 
ISI was already providing funding to the Taliban.13 It is difficult to track exactly how the ISI 
receives its funding, but the US provided it millions of dollars in the 1980s during the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan.14 Nevertheless, the ISI’s funding allows the Haqqani Network to funnel 
money into both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda while remaining detached just enough to keep its own 
title.15 
Although the funding from the ISI created large opportunities for the Haqqani Network, 
Jalaluddin was hesitant to rely on it as the only source of revenue, and he started making money 
using the methods that the Haqqani Network still utilizes today. The first and largest revenue 
source the Haqqani Network has is wealthy donors in the Arab Gulf.16 The network is also 
involved in extortion, kidnappings, robbery, and drug trafficking throughout Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.17 For example, the Haqqani Network conducted an attack on the Kabul Bank branch in 
Jalalabad, Afghanistan on February 19, 2011. Afghan police and soldiers were at the bank to 
collect their monthly salaries, and seven members of the Haqqani Network opened fire on 
them.18 The attack left 38 dead and many wounded and exhibited the extent to which the 
Haqqani Network will fight to obtain money.19  
                                                          
12 Marvin G. Weinbaum and Meher Babbar. The Tenacious, Toxic Haqqani Network, 4.  
13 Marvin G. Weinbaum and Meher Babbar. The Tenacious, Toxic Haqqani Network, 4. 
14 M Ilyas Khan, “Why Pakistan Won’t Share Intelligence with the US,” BBC News, January 14, 2018, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42664019. 
15 Marvin G. Weinbaum and Meher Babbar. The Tenacious, Toxic Haqqani Network, 4.  
16 Gretchen Peters. Haqqani Network Financing, 15.  
17 Gretchen Peters. Haqqani Network Financing, 39-50.  
18 Alissa J. Rubin, “Attackers Wearing Army Uniforms Make Deadly Assault on Bank in Afghanistan,” The New 
York Times, February 19, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/20/world/asia/20afghanistan.html. 
19 Gretchen Peters. Haqqani Network Financing, 45. 
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Apart from its illegal activities, the Haqqani Network maintains legal businesses such as 
the management of hospitals and madrassas. It even owns real estate throughout the Middle East 
and manages construction companies, trucking firms, and trading operations in the region as 
well.20 These operations help the Haqqani Network stay independent of Al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban while it continues to rely on the two groups as allies and partners in many attacks. The 
legal businesses also allow the Haqqani Network to have a kind of cover for its illegal activities. 
Because the Haqqani Network’s businesses are spread out over Afghanistan and Pakistan, it 
makes it difficult for citizens of these countries to reject its influence and causes the economy to 
rely on them, creating an environment where younger citizens are motivated to join the network 
and, in extension, be under the jurisdiction of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This is a useful tactic 
for the Haqqani Network that forces community dependence and allows for easy recruitment, 
especially under the network’s current leadership.  
Jalaluddin Haqqani died on September 3, 2018, but his sons have taken over the 
operations of the Haqqani Network and the Taliban. Sirajuddin Haqqani, one of Jalaluddin’s 
eldest sons, currently serves as the Chief Executive Officer of the entire network, overseeing 
both legal and illegal business operations and military activities.21 He also now holds the titles of 
emir and militant commander of the Taliban, meaning he is second in command and controls all 
its forces, essentially allowing them to unify the organizations when they choose but claim they 
are independent when it suits them.22 This is strategically advantageous, because the groups are 
all separate entities, but the leadership structure allows them to collaborate and share resources 
with ease. Under the leadership of Sirajuddin, the Haqqani Network has increased its level of 
                                                          
20 Gretchen Peters. Haqqani Network Financing, 51. 
21 Gretchen Peters. Haqqani Network Financing, 25. 
22 Devin Lurie, The Haqqani Network: The Shadow Group Supporting the Taliban’s Operations, American Security 
Project, (September 2020): preface.  
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security and secrecy while growing into a more diversified network with the number of 
businesses with which it is now involved. This has allowed it to further distance itself from the 
support of the ISI, although to an extent its support continues today.  
The Chief Financial Officer of the Haqqani Network is another one of Jalaluddin’s sons, 
Nasiruddin Haqqani. He is based in central Pakistan but frequently travels to Afghanistan, 
overseeing operations in both countries. Nasiruddin is known for often making trips around the 
Arabian Gulf, visiting with donors who support the Haqqani Network to maintain a good 
relationship.23 A United States Treasury Department report from 2010 states that he also 
regularly receives payments from Al-Qaeda’s leadership in addition to the money that the 
Haqqani Network collects from all its businesses.24 Overall, Sirajuddin and Nasiruddin are the 
two main operators of the Haqqani Network, have significant influence over the decisions of the 
Taliban, and have worked to expand their reach to countries across the Middle East. 
 Now that the establishment of the history of the connections between the Taliban, 
Haqqani Network, and Al-Qaeda and the way that the Haqqani Network has created alliances 
between the three throughout the years of their existence has been established, it is important to 
discuss their motivations for being involved in Afghan peace negotiations. The Taliban was 
formed in the early 1990s after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and it gained 
resources from the ISI. The main base of support in the first few years of its existence were 
Pashtun tribesmen who studied as seminaries and were from the southern and eastern regions of 
                                                          
23 Gretchen Peters. Haqqani Network Financing, 27.  
24 Gretchen Peters. Haqqani Network Financing, 27. 
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the country.25 The growth of the Taliban attracted recruits by campaigning for stability through 
the observance of rules in Afghanistan.26 
In September 1996, the Taliban attacked Kabul and staged a coup resulting in the Taliban 
declaring an Islamic Emirate, complete with its own strict leadership structure, under 
Mohammad Omar.27 During this time, Al-Qaeda and the Haqqani Network had aligned their 
leadership with the Taliban and the three groups shared the goal of keeping the Islamic Emirate 
stable. Once the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001, its forces were able to overthrow the Taliban 
and end the reign of the Islamic Emirate. As a result, the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Al-
Qaeda have been collaborating with one another to launch attacks against US forces, the forces 
of the Afghan government, the structures and officials of the government itself, and 
Afghanistan’s citizens. It is their intention to once more restore the Islamic Emirate. The recent 
agreement with the US government is the first time in twenty years that they have been able to 
get the US to say it is going to remove its forces. This has created the perfect chance for the 
Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Al-Qaeda to stage another coup against the Afghan government 
in order to achieve their ultimate goal and once again control Afghanistan in its entirety, which 
would result in significant backsliding of the country’s society in relation to women and minority 
rights. 
Literature Review 
 The GTD, managed by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START), is the largest unclassified database of terrorist attacks in the 
                                                          
25 Lindsay Maizland, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 15, 2021, 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan  
26 Lindsay Maizland, “The Taliban in Afghanistan.” 
27 Lindsay Maizland, “The Taliban in Afghanistan.” 
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world, and has more than 200,000 attacks recorded in it.28  Its entries range from 1970-2019 and 
include the date, location, target, weapons used, and number of casualties for each attack.29 In 
order to collect the information on each attack, START reviewed over four million news articles 
and 25,000 reports from just 1998-2019.30 The START team employs a data management system 
that filters attacks for the analysts to record and add to the database. Dr. Erin Miller, who holds a 
PhD in Criminology and Criminal Justice from the University of Maryland, manages the 
operation and has been contributing to the project since 2004.31  
The database has many entries detailing attacks leading up to the Afghan peace 
negotiations. The entries involving the Taliban and Haqqani Network before the peace 
negotiations will be discussed in the third chapter to explain how the three terrorist groups have 
been using attacks to target the government before the negotiations officially began. I 
categorized each attack during that time by attack target, date, and the number of casualties. The 
data I collected will be used to give an overview of the trends in targeting and will provide detail 
for instances of attacks that this thesis highlights as evidence for communication methods.  
The GTD only has attacks that the Haqqani Network and Taliban collaborated in up to 
2018, so the source of attack trends I will use for 2019 is the Global Terrorism Index 2020.  It is 
a report written by Vision of Humanity, an organization that provides data analysis in relation to 
country development.32 The Institute for Economics & Peace is a think tank that supplies Vision 
                                                          
28 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “About the GTD,” University of 
Maryland National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2021, 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/  
29 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “About the GTD.” 
30 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “About the GTD.”  
31 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Erin Miller,” University of 
Maryland National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2021, 
https://www.start.umd.edu/people/erin-miller  




of Humanity with the majority of its information.33 The Global Terrorism Index 2020 is a 
comprehensive report detailing the trends of terrorism in each country and the ways in which 
terrorism affects societies. It also discusses the targets, terrorist groups, and motivations of 
significant attacks, which is useful in identifying the trends in Afghanistan in relation to the 
peace negotiations. This thesis will take the trends reported in the Global Terrorism Index and 
explain how they are very similar to those seen in the GTD and news reports that give a 
perspective on the attacks throughout 2020 and 2021.  
There is not a large number of academic studies about the Afghan peace negotiations 
currently available, so in order to gain information on the attacks from 2020-2021, I used a range 
of news articles and reports from sources such as The New York Times, BBC News, The Council 
on Foreign Relations, Aljazeera, The Washington Post, The US Department of Defense, as well 
as ABC News. When pulling attack data from these sources, I made note of all the attack targets 
and number and occupation of the casualties from each. Doing so enabled me to compile my 
own list of attacks that further supported the trend I was hoping the attacks would explain, which 
again is the communication to the US and Afghan governments and facilitators of the 
negotiations through the attacks. These sources were also useful in forming the timeline of the 
negotiations. 
The way in which the Taliban are using the attacks during the negotiations is different 
from the way an attack would be used to gain leverage in a traditional battle or firefight between 
forces. When an attack is used in battle, its purpose is usually to defeat forces and aid the 
attacker in getting control of more territory. The Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Al-Qaeda are 
                                                          
33 Institute for Economics & Peace, “About Vision of Humanity.”  
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using their attacks during the negotiations to nonverbally communicate their thoughts about 
sharing governmental power. The Taliban launches attacks when the US and Afghan 
governments make a decision that it does not approve of, and that is a direct communication of 
its frustration and dissatisfaction of the current state of negotiations. By conducting attacks right 
after its disapproval of a decision, it is communicating outside of the realm of negotiations. 
Although the Taliban is not cooperating well with the US and Afghan governments and forces 
during the rounds of negotiations, its attacks are sending a separate, more violent message that 
the group may not be willing to state at the negotiation table. The targeting of Afghan military 
and security forces directly parallel with the attempted negotiating shows that the Taliban is 
using talks of potential peace for its own benefit and to act as though it can somewhat cooperate. 
In reality, the attacks are revealing the Taliban’s opinions about the negotiations more than the 
group’s statements in the negotiations, which are that it is not going to share power and expects 
the Afghan government to cede governmental control.  
There are no current studies available for public consumption that use the GTD to explain 
attacks in relation to the Afghan peace negotiations. There are various news reports that explain 
the relentless attacks on Afghan government forces since the beginning of the peace negotiations, 
but none of them map out the attacks to show a correlation between the type of target and the 
messages that the target type sends to the Afghan government. This study is also unique in the 
way that it ties the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Al-Qaeda together in the attacks and details 
the affect that the leadership of the three groups hope to have with the attacks.  
The Council on Foreign Relations published an article by the Center for Preventive 
Action on September 11, 2020 which provides a thorough overview of the negotiations since 
February 2020. I used this source when pulling events from the negotiations to align with 
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attacks, but the article is a perfect example of how recent the most current research is to the 
extent to which it discusses the attacks in a broader context, but does not explain what motivated 
the groups to choose specific targets. It takes the readers through the negotiations in 2020 and 
discusses the impacts of the negotiations on aspects of society such as the rights of women and 
children in Afghanistan, but offers no further analysis of the attacks.34  
This is a trend common in all the news articles and reports. The reports from The New 
York Times, BBC News, Aljazeera, ABC News, and The Washington Post had very similar 
formatting to one another. For example, an article from The New York Times summarized the 
accounts of all the recorded Taliban attacks that month.35 It gave an overview of what attacks 
occurred in each week of April 2020, and then provided more detail about each individual attack. 
Even though the sources outlined the attacks in a similar way, The New York Times is the only 
news source that listed the attacks in bulk. BBC News, Aljazeera, ABC News, and The 
Washington Post each have articles summarizing larger attacks, so it was important to pull 
information from each source to be able to portray a broader picture of what the attacks looked 
like as a whole in Afghanistan.  
None of the sources available relate the Taliban’s current attacks to past trends or the 
conceptual way that the group is utilizing these attacks. A report from the Center for Strategic & 
International Studies was the only study that mentioned the Taliban were using the negotiations 
to fight the war against the Afghan government by means of manipulation of attacks.36 Put 
                                                          
34 Center for Preventive Action, “What to Know About the Afghan Peace Negotiations,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, September 11, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/article/what-know-about-afghan-peace-negotiations  
35 Fahim Abed, “Afghan War Casualty Report: April 2020,” The New York Times Magazine, April 2, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/magazine/afghan-war-casualty-report-april-2020.html  
36 Center for Strategic & International Studies, “Afghanistan: The Peace Negotiations Have Become an Extension of 




simply, it discussed how the Taliban is using the negotiations as leverage to attack when it does 
not get an outcome that it desires. That is a major piece of this thesis’s argument, but the research 
presented in this thesis goes further to look at exactly what target type the Taliban is attacking 
most often and the relationship between that and its expected outcome of the negotiations.  
 Finally, there are no reports that synthesize the Biden Administration’s options in 
response to attacks and peace negotiations quite like the research of this thesis. Aljazeera and 
BBC News offer accounts of the Biden’s policy alternatives, but I have recommended the best 
choice for Biden based on the most practical aspects from each option. Although the Biden 
Administration has not released a peace plan that will be implemented and there will be 
continuous revisions of possible plans, this thesis concludes with what I believe is the most 
realistic plan based on the research conducted.   
  Since the negotiations are still ongoing and have yet to be seen as successful, there is not 
a large amount of academic material currently covering its processes or potential outcomes. In 
chapters two and three, this thesis will explain why this is and the impact the stagnant 
negotiations are currently having on both the US and Afghanistan. Since there is no existing 
official literature on the Biden Administration’s plan for withdrawing the rest of the troops or the 
way that the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Al-Qaeda will respond to US and Afghan policy 
actions, subsequent chapters will attempt to recommend the best policy decision for the US 
government. Additionally, it will discuss the ways in which a decision from Biden will affect the 
current relationship and dynamic with the three terrorist groups.    
Through analyzing and understanding the existing literature on the connections between 
the Haqqani Network, Taliban, and Al-Qaeda, it is clear that the groups offer aid to one another 
and have sufficient resources to continue attacks for the foreseen future. Showing a relationship 
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between the target of attacks and main events throughout the peace negotiations will demonstrate 
the ways the groups are using the attacks to communicate with the two governments. This thesis 









Chapter 2: Research Methods 
The primary research method in this thesis is the analysis and assessment of entries in the 
GTD that detail past attacks conducted by the collaboration of the Taliban, Haqqani Network, 
and Al-Qaeda. These entries will be used to discuss the quality of the Biden Administration’s 
possible policy responses to the Afghan peace negotiations and will suggest the most reasonable 
choice based on the current trend of attacks. Since the beginning of 2021, the Afghan peace 
negotiations have not produced any agreements between the US, the government of Afghanistan, 
and the Taliban.37 This is partly a result of the change in presidential administration in the US, as 
President Biden creates new policies and continues to work with those that President Trump put 
into place.38 Biden’s new policies and stances toward Afghanistan and the Taliban will show the 
trajectory of the US plan for either continuing or halting the removal of troops from Afghanistan, 
which will significantly affect how the Taliban views formulating an agreement with the US.39 
Currently, the Taliban hope that the US will remove all its forces as part of a peace agreement, 
and Taliban representatives have stated that if this is not achieved, the Taliban will have an 
obligation to continue conducting jihad in the country and target more pro-government forces 
and organizations.40 
The Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the Haqqani Network have stated that they are willing to 
cease violence and attacks once a formal peace agreement is reached, but they have not held up 
these claims during the negotiations, even when the US and Afghan governments attempted to 
                                                          
37 Center for Preventive Action, “What to Know About the Afghan Peace Negotiations.”  
38 Osama Bin Javaid, “Why Afghanistan-Taliban peace talks have not reached breakthrough,” Aljazeera, January 12, 
2021,  https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/12/why-have-the-afghanistan-taliban-peace-talks-stalled  
39 Ibraheem Bahiss, “What options does Biden have in Afghanistan?,” Aljazeera, February 4, 2021, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/2/4/what-options-does-biden-have-on-afghanistan  
40 Bahiss, “What options does Biden have in Afghanistan?”  
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enforce a county-wide ceasefire.41 As a result, attacks conducted in recent years, as indicated in 
the GTD, in which the Haqqani Network and Taliban have been involved together will be 
analyzed in order to best predict their future targets and likelihood they will follow any rules laid 
down by ceasefire agreements. Since the Haqqani Network, Taliban, and Al-Qaeda have 
continued to conduct attacks throughout the negotiations, it seems unlikely that the groups will 
agree to stop attacking the citizens, infrastructure, foreign actors, and governmental 
organizations in Afghanistan.  
When looking at the attacks that the Haqqani Network and Taliban have been involved in 
during the past five years, this thesis will aim to relate the targets of the attacks to the peace 
negotiations in a way that shows that they predict the next moves of the Haqqani Network and 
the Taliban and the impact that the attacks have on Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network has 
greatly intertwined itself with the actions, policies, and attacks of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and 
its participation in attacks will show the group’s power over the other two as well as its capacity 
to plan and execute complex attacks. For the purpose of this thesis, an “attack” by the Taliban, 
Haqqani Network, or Al-Qaeda will be defined as any violent action perpetrated toward any 
entity, organization, building, or group of people to inflict death, injury, or destruction.  
After detailing the possible options for the Biden Administration’s negotiations, Biden’s 
current policies toward the issue and attacks recorded in the GTD will be discussed to reveal the 
current state of the negotiations in relation to recent attacks. In order to efficiently analyze the 
GTD attacks and detail a history of attacks perpetrated by the Haqqani Network and Taliban, this 
thesis will first summarize the attacks recorded in the database involving the Haqqani Network 
                                                          
41  Javaid, “Why Afghanistan-Taliban peace talks have not reached breakthrough.”  
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and Taliban from 2006-2018. Once the history of those attacks is briefly established, the thesis 
will then examine the attacks from 2015-2018 more closely to analyze trends such as target type 
and amount of casualties and injuries accumulated. I chose 2015 as the starting point for a more 
in-depth analysis of the attacks because it is the year that the Taliban began increasing its 
lethality and frequency of attacks throughout Afghanistan.42 A major cause of this was the US 
government beginning to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. As it did so, it appears the 
Taliban took advantage of there being less of a US fighting force in the country.43  
Attack Target Total 
Religious figures/institutions 4 
Terrorists/Non-State militia 2 
Private citizens & property 24 
Government  18 
Private citizens & property, military 7 
Private citizens & property, police, military 2 
Police 9 
Government, police, private citizens & property 5 
Military 16 
Unknown 10 
NGO, private citizens & property 1 
Police, private citizens & property 2 
Police, business, private citizens and property 1 
Business, government, private citizens & property 1 
Journalism & media, terrorists/non-state militia 1 
Educational Institution 1 
Government 1 
Government, private citizens & property 1 
Journalists and Media 2 
Business, private citizens & property 1 
Business 5 
Government 9 
Military, government  1 
                                                          
42 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Blood and hope in Afghanistan: A June 2015 update,” Brookings, May 26, 2015, 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/blood-and-hope-in-afghanistan-a-june-2015-update/  
43 Felbab-Brown, “Blood and hope in Afghanistan: A June 2015 update.” 
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Airports and Aircraft 2 
Business, police 1 
Business, military 1 
Government, military 1 
Business, police, military 1 
Government, private citizens & property 1 
Journalists & Media, private citizens & property 1 
Government, military, private citizens & property 1 
Total number of attacks: 133  
This is a chart of the Haqqani Network and Taliban combined attacks from 2006-2018 pulled from the 
Global Terrorism Database. 
Attack Target Date Groups Involved 
Private citizens and property 8/21/2018 HN and Taliban 
Private citizens and property 8/21/2018 HN and Taliban 
Private citizens and property 8/21/2018 HN and Taliban 
Government 8/21/2018 HN and Taliban 
Private citizens and property, police, military 8/21/2018 HN and Taliban 
Private citizens and property, police, military 8/10/2018 HN and Taliban 
Police 6/22/2018 HN and Taliban 
Government, police, private citizens and property 5/30/2018 HN and Taliban 
Police, Private citizens and property 5/9/2018 HN and Taliban 
Police, Private citizens and property 5/9/2018 HN 
Unknown 2/13/2018 HN and Taliban 
Military 1/29/2018 HN and Taliban 
Police, business, private citizens and property 1/27/2018 HN and Taliban 
NGO, private citizens and property 1/24/2018 HN and Taliban 




Unknown 9/25/2017 HN 
Unknown 6/11/2017 HN 
Unknown 6/10/2017 HN 
Unknown 6/9/2017 HN 
Religious figures/institutions 6/9/2017 HN and Taliban 
Government, private citizens and property 5/31/2017 HN 
Military 4/21/2017 HN and Taliban 
Police 4/4/2017 HN 
Military 3/8/2017 HN and Taliban 
Military 1/13/2017 HN 
Government 1/10/2017 HN and Taliban 
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Private citizens and property 8/26/2016 HN and Taliban 
Educational institution 8/7/2016 HN and Taliban 
Unknown 5/27/2016 HN 
Government, private citizens and property 4/19/2016 HN and Taliban 
Journalists and media 1/20/2016 HN and Taliban 
Unknown 11/8/2015 HN 
Unknown 10/7/2015 HN 
Police 10/6/2015 HN 
Police 10/4/2015 HN 
Government 6/22/2015 HN and Taliban 
Business, private citizens and property 5/13/2015 HN and Taliban 
Business 4/19/2015 HN and Taliban 
Government, private citizens and property 4/2/2015 HN and Taliban 
Unknown  1/7/2015 HN 
This is a chart of Haqqani Network attacks and those attacks that the Haqqani Network and 
Taliban collaborated on from 2015-2018 pulled from the Global Terrorism Database (HN=Haqqani 
Network). 
To pull and sort the data from the GTD, I first searched all instances that included the 
Haqqani Network, Taliban, and Al-Qaeda and typed them into a spreadsheet for easier access 
and analysis. The latest Al-Qaeda attack mentioned in the database is from 2011, so it will not be 
included in the analysis of 2015-2021. Nevertheless, the group is still listed in the Global 
Terrorism Index 2020 as being active and known to often contribute to Taliban and Haqqani 
Network attacks and has leaders involved in both groups.44 Al-Qaeda is also frequently 
mentioned in articles and news updates on the Afghan peace negotiations because the group 
participates in decision-making and the planning of attacks for the Taliban. Therefore, even 
though Al-Qaeda is not recorded in the GTD from 2012-2018, it is evident that it is still playing 
a large role in the negotiations and are co-conspirators of attacks. 
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Because the Haqqani Network, Taliban, and Al-Qaeda have revealed they will not stop 
fighting until all foreign troops are out of Afghanistan but have shown no firm commitment to 
actually stop fighting, the US and Afghan governments have to be careful when creating future 
agreements, as the terrorist groups they are negotiating with are unpredictable and 
untrustworthy.45 A timeline of the various terrorist attacks conducted in Afghanistan by the 
Taliban and Haqqani Network from 2019-2020 along with the processes of the peace 
negotiations will be detailed and analyzed to show the ways in which the groups are using the 
attacks as a tool for communicating with the Afghan and US governments. This timeline will 
then be used to predict the future intentions and targets of the groups as the negotiations 
continue.  
In order to find the data needed for 2019, I will utilize the Global Terrorism Index 2020, 
which covers terrorism trends around the world from 2019, to exhibit the targets, casualties, and 
impacts of the attacks by the Taliban and Haqqani Network throughout the year. Since there has 
not yet been an official report written on terrorism trends in Afghanistan for 2020, I will be 
looking at the timeline of the peace negotiations and news reports detailing attacks from 2020 
that the Taliban perpetrated and will align them with important events in the negotiations. This 
will allow me to see how the group has used its attacks to communicate its dissatisfaction with 
the negotiations and the actions of the US and Afghan governments. Once I have this timeline 
established, the discussion will relate the trends and communicative messages of the attacks to 
the plans that the Biden Administration is currently trying to choose between to help best predict 
the next steps that the Biden Administration could take and the Taliban’s possible responses. I 
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will also further detail the consequences of each peace negotiation plan and how those plans will 




Chapter 3: Research and Results  
 To provide some background of the US interactions and deals with the Taliban in the 
peace negotiations and a sense of the timeline, it is important to provide details of the deal signed 
by the Trump Administration in February 2020. The US agreed to withdraw all troops from 
Afghanistan within fourteen months of signing the deal with the Taliban.46 The Trump 
Administration hoped that in response to this the Taliban would agree to prohibit Al-Qaeda and 
other terrorist groups from entering or operating in areas under its control.47 However, as the 
negotiations have progressed in the past year, there is no sign that the Taliban is going to uphold 
its portion of the agreement. It has in fact shown no commitment to distancing itself from the 
operations of Al-Qaeda and the Haqqani Network.  
 Now, the US under the Biden Administration is in a bind concerning its options for 
further negotiation. The Taliban has stated that if the US does not pull virtually all its troops by 
May 2021, it will begin specifically targeting US troops once again.48 However, if the US does 
pull out all its forces, it will give the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the Haqqani Network more leverage 
over the Afghan government. Even though the peace negotiations are currently centered on the 
idea that the Taliban could share power with the Afghan government, there have been no clear 
intentions stated by the Taliban that indicate this is its plan or that it would be willing to do so.49 
In order to understand the future actions of the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan, it is necessary to outline each possible route for the Biden Administration to take 
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when involved in negotiations. Ibraheem Bahiss, an independent analyst who focuses on 
Afghanistan, has outlined four options the US faces.  
Option 1: Total Withdrawal of Troops 
The first option is for the Biden Administration to pull all troops out of Afghanistan by 
the end of May 2021. This is problematic in many ways. If the US sends its troops home from 
Afghanistan, there will be no moderating force between the Taliban and the Afghan 
government.50 The US troops have provided a buffer between the two, and if taken out of the 
picture the Taliban and Afghan government may end negotiations altogether. Even more likely is 
that the Taliban will overpower the Afghan government and take control of the country.51 To put 
it mildly, the Taliban already believes that the Afghan security forces are not strong enough to 
fight on their own, which is supported by the amount of assistance US troops have provided over 
the past twenty years. Ultimately, if Biden choses to withdraw the troops, the Taliban will 
attempt to regain power through violence.  
Option 2: A Residual US Force Remains 
The second option, however, of leaving a residual force of US troops in Afghanistan, 
would be incredibly dangerous. A force such as this would benefit Afghanistan’s 
counterterrorism efforts, but the Taliban would begin to target American forces more heavily to 
show its disapproval of their presence and pressure the US to reverse this decision.52 As a result 
of increased attacks, the US would be forced to make a decision to either withdraw all soldiers or 
send more to the country, further prolonging and complicating the US war and influence in 
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Afghanistan.53 In addition, the Taliban would be likely to attack other foreign troops that are 
allied with the US and try to force them out of the country as well.54 The trajectory of the US 
thus far has been to remove its troops, and it would not be wise for President Biden to keep 
troops in Afghanistan if it will result in their immediate endangerment. However, if President 
Biden agrees to leave forces in Afghanistan and then reverses that decision, it will take away all 
US credibility. If US soldiers are left in the country, the US will need to send more back in to 
show the Taliban that it is willing to put up a fight for a successful peace negotiation process 
where the Taliban follows rules and agreements set by the Afghan government. There is no 
realistic way for the US to have leverage over the Taliban if it keeps only a small number of 
troops in the country. 
Option 3: Extend the Withdrawal Deadline 
Another potential option for the Biden Administration is to extend the deadline for 
withdrawing troops to sometime after May 2021. The Taliban may see this as a stalling 
technique, because the US would claim that it would not withdraw troops as a consequence of 
the Taliban not holding up its end of the deal with actions such as reducing the number of attacks 
conducted throughout Afghanistan.55 The Taliban has not agreed to cut ties with Al-Qaeda or the 
Haqqani Network, and all three groups have been involved in planning and executing attacks 
since the peace negotiations started. It is very unlikely that the Taliban will ever commit to 
forcing Al-Qaeda and the Haqqani Network out of Afghanistan, and it will attempt to use the 
negotiations to discuss the future of Afghanistan with the involvement of Al-Qaeda and Haqqani 
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Network members in the leadership structure.56 The Taliban has left all of its negotiation 
obligations unfulfilled, with the release of 5,000 of its prisoners by the Afghan government being 
the only solid deal they have been able to agree on, which was really a demand of the Taliban.57 
It seems as though the Taliban would be uncooperative and disapprove of an extension of the 
deadline, especially since it has already not been proactive in making the changes the US and 
Afghan governments hope to see. Nevertheless, the Taliban does not enjoy having any US 
soldiers left in the country, and the fact that there are still a couple thousand put some 
responsibility on the Taliban to continue considering negotiations. 
Option 4: Expand Peace Negotiations 
The fourth option is for the US to aid in an acceleration of peace negotiations between the 
Taliban and Afghan government.58 In order to do this, it would be beneficial for the Biden 
Administration to include countries such as Russia, China, and Iran in the negotiations so that 
there is regional support for Afghanistan when the US eventually withdraws all troops.59 A 
significant issue with this plan is that those countries are not US allies, so it would be helpful to 
involve the support of UN and NATO member countries as well because Russia, China, and Iran 
have less incentive to help the US and are unlikely to want a democratic government in 
Afghanistan. Once the US steps away from the conflict physically, it is recommended that it still 
provides monetary support to Afghanistan and invests in the country so that the US still has some 
influence.60 If the Biden Administration does decide to expedite the peace process, it will most 
likely still have to remove soldiers by the upcoming deadline in order to create some distance 
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from the country to avoid further conflict with the Taliban. Unfortunately, the US is running out 
of time to make a decision and records of recent attacks conducted by the Taliban in conjunction 
with Al-Qaeda and the Haqqani Network show that the groups are becoming increasingly 
impatient with the peace process and are willing to target the Afghan government and private 
citizens and property to achieve their goals. The Taliban stating it is willing to begin serious 
negotiations once the US no longer has any leverage is also a terrible sign and does not indicate 
any want to heed to the US plans or negotiation advice.  
Option 5: Bring More US Troops to Afghanistan 
 The final option is for the US to put its responsibility in the negotiations on hold until it 
can bring more troops back to Afghanistan. President Trump agreed to withdrawal troops 
knowing that his administration would not have to deal with the repercussions, and the Taliban 
asked for the withdrawal knowing that it was using it to further its political agenda of taking over 
the Afghan government. With the current state of Afghanistan and the influence the Taliban 
currently has, there is no way it will agree to any power-sharing agreement if the US is out of the 
picture. Under this option, the Biden Administration would need to bring at least about 5,000 
troops back into the country to convince the Taliban that it will face serious consequences if it 
does not begin to negotiate realistically with the Afghan government. Of course, if Biden does 
decide to bring in more troops, the Taliban will most likely target them and there will be an even 
greater increase in violence, but it might be a price that the US has to pay to show the Taliban 
that it is not leaving until a successful peace plan is created. Usually, a US government led by the 
Democrat party would not consider risking the danger that comes with sending more troops to 
Afghanistan, but Biden could frame the plan as being a decision he is forced to make because of 
President Trump’s past decisions.  
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 As a result of the approaching time limit for a decision from the US, the press has 
portrayed the Biden Administration as being disorganized. The current proposed peace plan is 
lacking in many areas that need to be addressed before the conclusion of the peace negotiations. 
First, it is now obvious that the Taliban is not seeking a political agreement between itself and 
the US and Afghan governments that allows for a sharing of power. It is looking to resurrect the 
Islamic Emirate, and it does not want to create a new form of government in which current 
Afghan officials are involved.61 A key predictor of this is the aforementioned fact that the 
Taliban has not agreed to cooperate and meet necessary requirements of halting its terrorist 
attacks in Afghanistan. It also has not committed or even mentioned splitting from Al-Qaeda or 
the Haqqani Network, and in February 2021 Sirajuddin Haqqani stated in a speech about the 
peace negotiations that the three terrorist groups will remain “united in a sacred bond.”62 It is 
evident from this speech that Sirajuddin is expecting the Taliban to foster the rise of a new 
Islamic Emirate and that he is assuming its resurrection will be a result of the peace 
negotiations.63 
 The Biden Administration’s willingness to follow through with a peace deal with the 
Taliban even though it has virtually announced its future plans for Afghanistan through way of 
rebuilding the Islamic Emirate shows how desperate the US is to completing the negotiations. 
The Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Al-Qaeda have been attempting to restore the Islamic 
Emirate for about twenty years, and there is no reason or motivation for the three groups to 
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change their plans.64 They are collaborating to push for the removal of US troops because they 
are aware it will make it much easier for them to take over Afghanistan. The current peace plan 
from the Biden Administration is taking the Afghan government’s negotiations with the Taliban 
for granted and it is unwise of the administration to believe the Taliban will cooperate.65 
 The peace plan proposed by the Biden Administration suggests an interim government, 
which would follow Afghanistan’s Constitution of 2004.66 It requires that the interim 
government ensure the protection of women and children’s rights in the social, economic, 
political, and cultural spheres of life in Afghanistan.67 In addition, the government under the 
2004 Constitution calls for the Taliban to be in control of the religion in Afghanistan, which is 
interpreted as Islam.68 A major issue with this is that the Taliban’s plan is to rule through radical 
Islam, and the practice will consume every part of the government and Afghan citizens’ lives.69 
Once the Taliban is given leadership over religion, it will use it to begin its resurrection of the 
Islamic Emirate. Furthermore, if the Taliban has this control, it is not going to recognize the 
rights of women and children to the extent that the US and Afghan governments are hoping for, 
if at all.  
 Another stipulation of the interim government is that it allows for free and fair elections, 
which is another goal that will not be achieved if the Islamic Emirate is rebuilt.70 The structure of 
the Islamic Emirate requires following one caliphate leader, who has been historically the leader 
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until death.71 This also conflicts with the vision of the new Afghan government to set up a 
unified Afghan state headed by one national government with no outside security forces.72 If 
following the plan of the Taliban for the future of Afghanistan, it will be a unified state under 
radical Islamic rule without free or fair elections or the protection of minority, women’s, or 
children’s rights. Additionally, the Taliban will certainly take women and people of minority 
ethnic groups out of positions of power.73 
 Ultimately, the Biden Administrations’ hope to push out this plan as soon as possible to 
encourage an agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban (and in association the 
Haqqani Network and Al-Qaeda) shows the haphazard nature of the process. It is evident that the 
Taliban is not going to follow through with any of the goals of the interim government proposed 
in the plan and that it will try its best to rebuild the caliphate as soon as possible. From the 
trajectory of the peace negotiations thus far, it seems as though the Taliban will reject such a plan 
and demand sole control over the Afghan government.  
 The attacks conducted by the Taliban in collaboration with the Haqqani Network and Al-
Qaeda in the last few years communicate that the three groups are not willing to give up any 
control over districts in Afghanistan. At the start of 2021, the Taliban controlled about 19 percent 
of the districts in Afghanistan, with the Afghan government controlling 33 percent.74 That is a 
large portion of Afghanistan for the Taliban to oversee, and its influence is only growing. The 
group is reported to be stronger now than it has been in several years and has between 55,000 
and 85,000 fighters.75 This further stresses that the Taliban is far from giving up the fight or 
                                                          
71 Lindsay Maizland, “The Taliban in Afghanistan.” 
72 Ward, “The Biden Administration’s leaked Afghanistan peace plan, explained.” 
73 Ward, “The Biden Administration’s leaked Afghanistan peace plan, explained.” 
74 Maizland, “The Taliban in Afghanistan.” 
75 Maizland, “The Taliban in Afghanistan.” 
32 
 
being willing to participate in power-sharing with the Afghan government. It has been using its 
attacks to show the world this, and the US seems to be dangerously over-looking it.  
 In this age of social media and constant interaction on the internet, terrorists have learned 
to use their attacks to communicate with the world.76 They are aware that their attacks are 
meaningful and will spread rapidly across news outlets, and they are able to manipulate the 
attacks in ways that show specific messages.77 This is exactly what the Taliban has been doing in 
Afghanistan over the past few years. The START GTD provides details about recent attacks 
conducted by the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Al-Qaeda that will be used to analyze the 
purpose and impact of the attacks in Afghanistan in the past few years to show that the groups 
have been targeting the Afghan government and citizens to communicate their intentions of 
ruling the country. To discuss the attacks conducted in the past year, details from the Global 
Terrorism Index 2020 will also be utilized to predict the future of attacks in Afghanistan and the 
way in which the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Al-Qaeda are using them to further their 
political agenda.  
 The attacks compiled in the GTD including the Haqqani Network, Taliban, and Al-Qaeda 
range from 2006-2018. During that period, there were 133 attacks that involved the Haqqani 
Network as an actor and all but five took place in Afghanistan, with those five in Pakistan.78 Of 
those attacks, the GTD listed the Taliban as collaborating in 32 of them, or 24 percent.79 In 
addition, 36 percent of the attacks including the Haqqani Network as a perpetrator were targeted 
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toward private citizens and property, and 29 percent were targeted toward the Afghan 
government.80 Interestingly, the majority of the aid from the Taliban in the attacks led by the 
Haqqani Network began around 2015, and as a result the years 2015-2021 will be further 
analyzed in the context of the Afghan peace negotiations. 
 The GTD has entries with attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda from 1992-2011, but since the 
entries with the Haqqani Network and Taliban together begin in 2006, only the data from 2006-
2011 will be analyzed for the purpose of this thesis to align the groups. From 2006-2011 Al-
Qaeda is listed as conducting fourteen attacks, with two of them being collaborations with the 
Taliban.81 Of the fourteen attacks, one is listed as being targeted at the Afghan government and 
one had a target of a primary school in eastern Afghanistan.82 These two attacks were the only 
ones listed as taking place in Afghanistan out of the fourteen, and as a result, the GTD provides 
context into the frequency with which the group perpetrated attacks as a unified group. Al-Qaeda 
is an important actor in the current peace negotiations, and its lack of recorded attacks from 
2012-2018 shows that the Taliban has mainly relied on the Haqqani Network forces when 
executing attacks.  
 From 2015-2018, the GTD has the Haqqani Network listed in a total of forty-one attacks, 
all of which took place in Afghanistan.83 In addition, the Taliban collaborated in twenty-six of 
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the forty-one attacks.84 One of the most significant trends was the number targeted toward the 
Afghan government and its police and military forces. Twenty-two of the forty-one attacks were 
categorized as being targeted toward the Afghan government and security forces, which is 53.5 
percent of the attacks.85 In contrast, 39 percent were targeted toward private citizens and 
property.86 This increase in violence toward the Afghan government and security forces shows 
how the Haqqani Network and Taliban were becoming more dissatisfied and impatient with the 
political situation in Afghanistan and wanted to communicate it through attacks.  
 During 2015, the US began to withdraw some of its military from Afghanistan and the 
Haqqani Network, Taliban, and Al-Qaeda were trying to further assert their dominance in the 
region. 87 Much as how the groups see it now, the removal of American troops from the country 
meant they could quickly intimidate and gain power over the government and additional regions 
of Afghanistan.88 It was evident at the time that the Afghan government under the leadership of 
President Ashraf Ghani was experiencing structural issues that the Taliban and its affiliates could 
easily use as leverage to make the government even more unstable by its frequency of attacks.89 
The timing of this aligns perfectly with the increase of attacks led by both the Haqqani Network 
and Taliban together, as 2015 saw a peak in the fighting between the Taliban and Afghan 
security forces since 2001.90  
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 When Afghanistan elected President Ghani in 2014, one of the main goals of his platform 
was to begin negotiating internally with the Taliban and foreign actors to create a better political 
atmosphere throughout the country.91 He traveled to Pakistan to ask the Pakistani government to 
stop its support of the Taliban and affiliate groups such as the Haqqani Network, but ultimately 
the Pakistani government made false promises to President Ghani and lethal attacks, such as the 
one at the Park Hotel in Kabul in May 2015, continued to occur.92 Although Pakistan has 
monetarily supported militant groups for years, it lacks the control needed to keep the Taliban, 
Haqqani Network, and Al-Qaeda from attacking regions throughout Afghanistan.93  
 Once these efforts to use the Pakistani government as an actor of counterterrorism failed, 
President Ghani turned to direct meetings with the Taliban.94 During a conference in Qatar in 
May 2015, the Afghan government and Taliban discussed demands of the Taliban such as 
reevaluating the Afghan Constitution and the reopening of the Taliban’s Qatar office space.95 
These concessions look almost exactly like what the Taliban is expecting from the Afghan 
government today. In May 2015, the Taliban also pushed for the US to remove all troops before 
it would take the negotiations seriously, which foreshadowed the current plans of the Taliban.96 
It is now clear that the Taliban’s motivations were the same in 2015 as they are now, with the 
group expecting Afghanistan to place itself in perfect position for the Taliban, Haqqani Network, 
and Al-Qaeda to begin its resurrection of the caliphate.   
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 Since 2015, the Taliban has continued to conduct lethal attacks throughout Afghanistan 
to send a message to both the Afghan and US governments. The attacks that result in the greatest 
number of people being injured or killed are those targeted at the Afghan government and 
military. For example, on April 19th, 2016, the Haqqani Network and Taliban carried out an 
attack on the Afghan government that left seventy-one people dead and 347 injured.97 Another 
attack on the Afghan military forces on April 21st, 2017 resulted in the deaths of 266 Afghan 
military personnel and left sixty-four injured.98 The latter attack was reported to be on a mosque 
and dining hall at the Afghan military facility of Camp Shaheen, which is outside of Mazar-e-
Sharif in Afghanistan.99 Finally, an attack on Afghan military and police forces involving the 
Haqqani Network and Taliban on August 10th, 2018 caused the deaths of 466 people, leaving the 
number of injured unknown.100  
According to the GTD, the Taliban immediately claimed responsibility and stated that it 
believed the August 10th attack “would strengthen [its] position in talks” with the Afghan 
government.101 Additionally, President Ghani and the Taliban had been discussing engaging in 
an official ceasefire, which the Taliban was already preparing to break as they conducted 
subsequent attacks in the weeks following.102 This example highlights the way in which the 
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Taliban utilizes violence as a leveraging tool to evoke fear from the Afghan government. The 
Taliban and its affiliates such as the Haqqani Network continuing to attack during a ceasefire is 
also a decision from the groups that has been made many times throughout the negotiations in 
2020 and will mostly likely carry into 2021. 
 These examples show how the Taliban and Haqqani Network have used their targets to 
communicate their dissatisfaction with the actions and political stances of the current Afghan 
government under President Ghani. The frequency and days chosen by the Taliban and Haqqani 
Network to attack the government and security forces of Afghanistan are anything but random. 
The Taliban is often choosing days to conduct large attacks when the Afghan government has 
failed to concede to Taliban demands. The Taliban attacking throughout ceasefire periods is a 
direct action of defiance against the Afghan government, as it is using those periods to show it is 
actively choosing to disregard the Afghan government’s wishes and kill more of its citizens and 
security forces, who the Taliban sees as disrespectful of it. This is how the Taliban, Haqqani 
Network, and Al-Qaeda are using the attacks as communication. As soon as the Afghan or US 
government fails to make a decision it was hoping for, the Taliban attacks a target it knows will 
get the attention of the government.  
These attacks exhibit the growing impatience of the Taliban and its affiliate groups to 
once again control Afghanistan and achieve their goal of living under the caliphate. The 
communication and collaboration between the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and leadership and 
forces of Al-Qaeda stresses once again how the Taliban is not willing or planning to break its ties 
with either the Haqqani Network or Al-Qaeda. The support offered from the latter two groups 
fuels the Taliban’s forces and makes the influence of both groups stronger in the region. During 
the peace negotiations of 2020-2021, the three terrorist groups are not going to give up any 
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power or make concessions concerning their influence over the Afghan government that they 
were not willing to make in 2015.  
 Although the GTD does not have data entries for Haqqani Network and Taliban 
combined attacks past 2018, the Global Terrorism Index will be the main source of data for the 
years 2019. In 2019, Afghanistan was the country most impacted by terrorism. 41 percent of the 
deaths in Afghanistan that year were from terrorist attacks, with the Taliban acting as the second 
most deadly terrorist group in the world.103 Over half of these deaths were of Afghan police and 
military forces members, which were also the two groups the Taliban targeted most frequently in 
2019.104 The Global Terrorism Index states that the Taliban’s focus on targeting security forces 
was to “undermine state stability”, which is on trend with its current goal of weakening the 
power of the Afghan government in order to make conditions ripe for takeover.  
 Throughout 2019, the Taliban conducted 88 attacks that caused 486 deaths of Afghan 
security forces alone.105 Overall, the group was responsible for 4,990 deaths.106 The tactics used 
for the attacks varied significantly, and one of note for this thesis is that assassinations by the 
Taliban increased 40 percent from 2018 to 2019, with the targets being military and government 
personnel.107 It is probable that the aim of the assassinations were to begin communicating the 
Taliban’s disagreements with the decisions of government officials. Although these attacks are 
attributed to the Taliban, it is important to note that the Haqqani Network and members of Al-
Qaeda are recognized as being some of the most advanced forces fighting for the Taliban and 
that even though the Taliban is labeled as the perpetrator for many attacks, the Haqqani Network 
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and Al-Qaeda are almost always involved as well.108 The desire to assassinate Afghanistan’s 
military and political figures provides further evidence that the three groups are hoping to 
destabilize the government as much as possible to make the transfer of leadership even easier. As 
the data will show throughout 2020, this trend has continued, if not worsened.  
 The beginning of the most recent round of Afghan peace negotiations in 2020-2021 was 
in February 2020.109 In the texts resulting from the negotiations so far, the Taliban has only 
mentioned restraining its affiliate groups from attacking other countries, but has mentioned 
nothing about ceasing attacks and violence throughout Afghanistan.110 This trend is 
demonstrated in the fact that right after the Trump Administration agreed to begin withdrawing 
forces from Afghanistan in February 2020, the Taliban considerably increased the attacks carried 
out in the country.111 A report released by the Afghan National Security Council in May 2020 
revealed that the Taliban had conducted an average of fifty-five attacks a day since March 1st, 
2020.112 The exact details and prevalence of attacks were not discussed by the American media 
in 2020 because they were overshadowed by events such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 
US Presidential election, and the murder of George Floyd.113 Nevertheless, the attacks created 
tensions between the negotiating parties and caused hesitation from the Taliban, prolonging the 
peace process. 
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 In early April 2020, the peace negotiations were supposed to continue with the Afghan 
government releasing over 100 Taliban prisoners, but the Afghan government was not prepared 
for the release and halted the process.114 The issue with the release stemmed from the fact that 
the Taliban wanted senior leaders released first, and the Afghan government saw the freeing of 
men who had been orchestrators of deadly attacks as too much of a safety risk.115 Shortly after 
this setback, Afghanistan saw even more attacks launched by the Taliban, with eighty-eight 
Afghan security force members being killed in the week of April 24-30, 2020.116 Furthermore, 
out of thirty-five attacks that week, thirty of them involved the killing of Afghan security forces 
and soldiers.117 From these statistics and the large amount of attacks the Taliban and its affiliates 
were conducting from March-May 2020, it is apparent that the Taliban’s dissatisfaction with the 
processes of the negotiations affected its attack targets, further exhibiting the nature by which it 
uses its attacks as a communication measure.  
 Despite abiding by a brief ceasefire in July 2020 for Eid al-Adha, a holy Islamic holiday 
practiced by Muslims that honors sacrifice by the prophet Ibrahim, the attacks continued to 
increase to the point of being 50 percent more prevalent from July-September 2020 than in the 
first few months of 2020.118 The US and Afghan governments expressed their worry for the 
attacks further pausing progress in the negotiations, but ultimately the two governments had 
limited options for taking action against the Taliban and actors such as the Haqqani Network and 
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Al-Qaeda. If anything, the culmination of the Taliban-perpetrated attacks throughout 2020 show 
that if the Taliban believed the peace negotiations did not benefit its political agenda, it will 
attack the Afghan government and security forces, further weakening them and setting the 
conditions for the Taliban to exert more power over the country.  
 As a result of the setbacks in the negotiations from disagreements between the US and 
Afghan governments and the Taliban, the official negotiations were scheduled to begin in 
September 2020 after the Afghan government agreed to release 1,500 prisoners to the Taliban.119 
Since the end of 2020 and throughout the first few months of 2021, the peace negotiations have 
not made much progress and the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Al-Qaeda are still conducting 
attacks throughout Afghanistan and reject the idea of ever cutting ties with one another.120 A 
major cause of the stalling of negotiations has been the Taliban and Afghan government waiting 
to see what plan the Biden Administration will support, which is currently still undecided.121 
 After Biden’s plan for the Taliban-Afghan government power sharing leaked in early 
March 2021, Turkey announced that it would host the next round of peace negotiations in 
Istanbul in April.122 It is obvious from the Taliban’s motivations that it is not willing to share 
governmental power with leaders of the current Afghan government. In the proposed plan, the 
Taliban is supposed to be in control of religion in Afghanistan, which is counter-productive 
because of the way the Taliban’s radical Islamic beliefs will envelop the entire society, bringing 
back a period of suffering and fear for citizens of the country, especially women, children, and 
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minorities. As the Taliban and Afghan government wait for the official plan of the Biden 
Administration, the Taliban is likely to become increasingly impatient and stay consistent with 
its high numbers of attacks. 
 Unfortunately, it seems as though time is running out for the Biden Administration to 
create the most effective and safe plan for navigating the peace negotiations. Since the process 
has already taken about a year and not much has come from past negotiations, the US may be 
wrapped up in the conflict for a longer amount of time than it is anticipating. When analyzing the 
current options the US and Afghan governments have, the probability of the Taliban and its 
Haqqani Network and Al-Qaeda affiliates agreeing to follow rules and adhere to requests of the 













Chapter 4: Discussion 
 The trends in terrorist attacks in Afghanistan from the Taliban and its affiliates in the first 
few months of 2021 are synonymous with the trends discussed in this thesis from the past few 
years. In March 2021, there were about 259 members of the Afghan security forces killed, and 
that number was released with the disclaimer that it did not include attacks the Taliban did not 
take credit for.123 This high number of casualties for one month indicates that, as predicted, the 
Taliban are not going to stop conducting attacks throughout the country, even if it signs an 
agreement to do so. Its disregard for the wishes of its American and Afghan bargaining partners 
concerning the levels of violence while a peace plan is being negotiated ultimately shows its lack 
of concern for cooperating with any government. As the data has demonstrated, the Taliban 
seems to be focused solely on gaining enough control over the government to restore the 
leadership system it had twenty years ago.  
 A report by Human Rights Watch from April 1, 2021, details that the Taliban has also 
begun targeting journalists and news organizations in the country.124 The Taliban align the media 
in Afghanistan with the government, and it believes that journalists are not “respect[ing] Islamic 
values,” which further foreshadows how, once it holds official power in Afghanistan, it will use 
its influence over religion to control all citizens.125 The main purpose of targeting journalists is 
most likely a way of sending political messages to the Afghan government. Silencing the media 
creates even more tension between leaders of the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Al-Qaeda and 
the Afghan government because it reveals the malicious intentions of the Taliban to form a state 
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that limits the actions of organizations like the press. Another motivation of the Taliban to attack 
media is its desire to assert its dominance in regions in which it currently holds the most power, 
as well as in Kabul.126 The Taliban is well aware that its targeting of the media will spread fear 
across the country, and especially into regions that the Taliban has not yet taken control over. 
Afghan citizens have access to various media outlets, many of which are privately owned.127 
Although there are many news sources available online, at the end of 2018 only 17.6 percent of 
the population regularly used the internet.128 The majority of citizens receive their news coverage 
from radio stations, of which there are 170 to choose from in the country.129 The Taliban are 
using attacks against the media as almost an extension of attacks on the government and Afghan 
forces, because it wants to intimidate any organization possibly influencing or related to the 
current leadership. Attacks on private news stations and papers threaten the idea of independence 
in Afghanistan because the attacks stop sources from broadcasting negative views of the Taliban. 
Without the coverage of independent news agencies and journalists telling Afghan citizens about 
the atrocities committed by the Taliban and the group’s plans, they are unaware of the true 
impact the Taliban is having on the country.  
 In addition, these attacks have caused a mass out-migration of women journalists from 
Afghanistan as the Taliban is forcing them to leave the country and abandon their jobs.130 As 
highlighted above, if the Afghan government allows the Taliban to control any part of the 
government, the country is going to see major backsliding from the progress made in promoting 
women’s rights in society generally and in the workplace in particular, especially in public 
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facing jobs such as reporters. This has been most visible in attacks on television anchors and 
reporters, since they, of course, are perhaps the most visible symbols of women’s progress.131 It 
is against the Taliban’s beliefs for women to be involved in government processes, and that will 
mean women will be particular targets because there are many currently holding positions in the 
Afghan legislature, military and police.132 At this point in the negotiations, it seems as if this will 
be inevitable. The US government has already withdrawn too many troops to have a strong 
physical influence and the Afghan government will not be able to withstand the constant 
violence from the Taliban for much longer. 
 The expansion of the target set from government forces to media personnel also shows 
that the Taliban is prepared to attack any force or organization that obstructs its path to its goal of 
rebuilding the Islamic Emirate. It has the manpower needed to continue attacks for the 
foreseeable future, and for the US to meet the amount of human resources required to properly 
fight back, it would need to send thousands of troops into the country. The Biden Administration 
has shown no indication it is prepared to take that step.  
The Taliban and Haqqani Network have been the two main groups executing the attacks 
in Afghanistan the past few years, but it is important to note that Al-Qaeda still holds a large 
amount of influence with the two groups. It is as much involved in the negotiations as the other 
two have been, which is dangerous because if the negotiations fail and the Taliban holds all the 
governmental power, Al-Qaeda is going to use that to its advantage and will count it as another 
victory for it over the US. Though the data from the GTD does not include attacks from Al-
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Qaeda past 2011, the terrorist group is still very much active and dangerous. In 2019, Al-Qaeda 
mainly conducted attacks throughout Yemen, but its leadership was also involved in aiding the 
Taliban and Haqqani Network in the negotiations.133 If the Taliban is able to gain control over 
the Afghan government, (and it seems it is closer to its goal than it has been at any point in the 
past 20 years), Al-Qaeda will more than likely become more active in the country once again.  
 This is exactly what the US and Afghan governments were hoping to avoid throughout 
the negotiations. The two governments attempted to get the Taliban to agree to prohibit outside 
terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda from conducting attacks in the country in exchange for the 
removal of troops, but it is evident that agreement is never going to be honored by the Taliban. It 
has already broken many of the agreement’s stipulations and is clearly going to continue to let 
the Haqqani Network, Al-Qaeda, and other foreign terrorist groups recruit members from within 
the country and attack where they please, especially if the group believes the Afghan and US 
governments are taking too much time to create a plan that satisfies it.134 The Taliban’s 
frustrations have been explained through its preferred methods of communication by attacks 
targeting government forces, and the group seems to be growing impatient. 
 The Center for Strategic & International Studies state that the Taliban and Afghan 
government are now in a war that is being fought by the unconventional means of 
negotiations.135 More simply, the Taliban are using the negotiations to engage with the 
government and pass off its recent attacks as consequences of the Afghan and US governments 
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not making decisions it hopes to see. It is likely that the decreasing numbers of US troops in the 
country since 2015 was the catalyst for leaders of the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Al-Qaeda 
to mobilize fighters in order to gain an upper hand over the Afghan government.  
The main conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Taliban see the 2021 negotiations 
and the withdrawal of troops as a perfect chance to communicate that it is going to essentially 
violently “negotiate” with the Afghan and US governments until they are forced to give into the 
demands of the Taliban. The current plan set forth by the Biden Administration ignores this level 
of aggression from the Taliban and hopes that it will begin agreeing to negotiation requirements, 
which is highly unlikely. If the Taliban gains control over enough of Afghanistan, which could 
happen in the next year, the group could potentially stage a coup with the aid of the Haqqani 
Network and Al-Qaeda.  
 In the beginning of January 2021, the Trump Administration took action to decrease the 
number of US troops in Afghanistan to about 2,500 soldiers.136 President Trump’s February 2020 
agreement with the Taliban did not create any necessary conditions for successful negotiations. It 
only began the process of withdrawing troops with no conditions, and has left the Biden 
Administration with the decision to further endanger US troops by leaving them in the country, 
or to finishing the withdrawal, leaving the Afghan government to essentially fend for itself. The 
previous chapter noted that the Taliban is reported to have between 55,000 and 85,000 fighters in 
Afghanistan, not including the thousands it has at the ready from the Haqqani Network and Al-
Qaeda.137 Therefore, when comparing the strength of the US and Afghan forces combined versus 
that of the Taliban and its affiliates, the Afghan government, which has about 175,000 troops but 
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who are not sufficiently trained to operate on their own, is no match for the Taliban. About 
73,000 Afghan troops and security force members have been killed by the Taliban since 2007, 
and that number is predicted to rise dramatically in the next year.138 The Afghan government has 
been relying on the training and strength from the US soldiers for the past twenty years. Even if 
none of the troops are pulled out of the country by the end of April 2021, the Taliban is currently 
holding enough territory to pose a serious threat to the government and the small amount of 
political stability provided by President Ghani.  
 Although the Afghan government will be significantly threatened if the US troops leave, 
the main consensus among American citizens is that the Biden Administration should offer aid to 
Afghanistan in formulating and agreeing on a peace deal with the Taliban, but then it should 
remove itself from the resulting conflict.139 The toll that this twenty-year war has taken on the 
economy, society, and military of the US has been enormous. Everything accomplished during 
this war with terrorist groups throughout Afghanistan will be essentially undone because the US 
and Afghan governments are now being forced to negotiate with terrorists.140  
These negotiations would never have been considered by the US in 2001 after the attack 
on the World Trade Centers, Washington, and Pennsylvania, and the need to complete the 
negotiations now ultimately demonstrates the amount of power and credibility ceded to the 
Taliban. Unfortunately, that is now the reality of the situation. American citizens do not support 
the war and some feel apathetic about it. But if that is the case, the US should no longer involve 
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its troops. Additionally, and not coincidentally, the war in Afghanistan is very rarely in the 
headlines of media sources. It is virtually impossible to sustain support for an American military 
effort that Americans are never reminded of or asked to support. As a result, the Biden 
Administration should withdrawal the remainder of the troops. 
 The Biden Administration supports the provision of foreign aid to countries in need, and 
it seems that the best option at this point in the negotiations is to offer that through a written 
peace plan and an explanation of how to implement it. It is probable that Biden will most likely 
attempt to extend the date for all troops to be removed from Afghanistan, because there is now 
less than a month until the previously agreed upon date and there has been no current effort 
underway to withdraw the rest of the troops. In response to this, the Taliban is predicted to 
specifically target US troops once again, and the Biden Administration will need to consider the 
number of casualties that will result. If the attacks do increase, it could enable news of the 
conflict to gain press coverage and US citizens may begin to support the war once again. 
 The US civilian population is tired of the war in Afghanistan and would like to see the 
soldiers come home. A poll conducted by the Charles Koch Institute in August 2020 revealed 
that three-quarters of US adults stated they support bringing all US troops home from 
Afghanistan.141  Even though this would be an ideal outcome if successful negotiations were 
established, it is important to stress the loss of credibility the US will suffer if it does withdraw 
all forces. It will be extremely difficult to continue negotiating with the Taliban if the Afghan 
government has no leverage and no extra forces to back it up and the US has no basis for making 
threats. Once the US no longer poses a physical threat to the Taliban, it is likely that it and its 
                                                          





affiliates will ignore the wishes of the Afghan government. It may not be beneficial for the US to 
stay physically involved in the conflict at this time, but that is why it is important to receive the 
support of UN and NATO member countries. Various countries have contributed to fighting 
against the War on Terror over the past twenty years, and for it to truly end in successful 
negotiations, the US cannot be the only country supporting the Afghan government. In order to 
gain support from UN and NATO member countries, US troops may need to stay in Afghanistan 
at their own personal risk, but it will be a price worth paying if support is received.  
Gaps in This Research 
 Recommending a policy outcome is challenging considering these circumstances. One of 
the main gaps in the research conducted throughout this thesis is that the negotiations are 
progressing extremely slowly, and the best policy options for the Biden Administration could 
change in the next few months. There is currently no way to know what Biden’s real plan for 
negotiations will be. His tentative plan for the sharing of power in an interim Afghan government 
was harshly criticized by the press, which enabled the world to see all the problematic aspects in 
that plan.142 The Taliban and its Haqqani Network and Al-Qaeda leaders are not going to agree 
to share any power without the forceful motivation of it being enforced by another country such 
as the US.  
 Biden is likely to revise his current plan and should write it in a way that would leave the 
Afghan government with more power, especially over religion. If the Taliban is given 
jurisdiction over religion in the country, it will control virtually all the social and political aspects 
of society. The Afghan government cannot afford for the Taliban to be put in that position, and if 
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that were left in the current plan, the Biden Administration would be handing the government to 
the Taliban. Since it has a much larger number of experienced fighters, the Taliban would easily 
be able to throw all Afghan officials out of their positions. Even though it would be the best 
move to prohibit the Taliban from controlling religious aspects of Afghanistan, it is unknown 
what other sections of the government it would be safe for it to lead. 
 Finally, a third gap is the research specifically from 2020-2021, since there is no official 
database detailing the Taliban’s attacks. When they are eventually reported on and compiled into 
a database, the number, lethality, and impact that they had on Afghanistan should be around the 
same as what this thesis has detailed. In reality, the number of attacks will most likely be greater 
than what the numbers that are currently available show. Depending on how the peace 
negotiations go throughout the rest of 2021, the US could see the situation and level of attacks in 
Afghanistan get much worse, which is difficult to imagine as the Taliban continues to 





Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 The attacks executed by the Taliban and Haqqani Network from 2015-2018 demonstrate 
a pattern of targeting Afghan government forces. This trend likely began as a response to the US 
beginning the withdrawal of troops from the country. From 2019-2021, the attacks have followed 
the same trajectory, increasing in number and focusing on Afghan security forces and 
organizations the Taliban sees as extensions of the government, such as media outlets and 
independent journalists. The Taliban has disregarded all requests of the US and Afghan 
governments to stop the violence and conduct itself peacefully throughout negotiations. The 
attacks analyzed from the GTD, the Global Terrorism Index 2020, and various news sources and 
reports have supported this thesis’s overall claim, that the Taliban and its affiliates are using the 
targets of their attacks to communicate to the US and Afghan governments. By targeting 
government forces, the three groups are nonverbally communicating that they do not agree with 
current peace plans proposed by the Biden Administration and will not participate in events such 
as the elections that President Ghani has suggested. When the US or Afghan government 
recommend any sort of power-sharing dynamic between the Taliban and Afghan government, 
the Taliban rejects it and conducts more attacks. Ultimately, the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and 
Al-Qaeda are not going to be satisfied until they hold most or all of the power over the 
government and are able to reestablish the Islamic Emirate.  
Recommendations and Lessons Learned  
 The US government no longer holds any leverage in Afghanistan because of the small 
number of troops left in the country. Therefore, if the Biden Administration wants the US to 
remain supportive of the Afghan government, it will need to extend the stay of US troops and 
possibly send more back in. To gain any aid from UN or NATO member countries, it is 
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absolutely necessary for the Biden Administration to keep US troops in Afghanistan, because if 
the US physically withdraws, then other allies are much less likely to help the US because it 
would have no ability to bargain with the Taliban. The US will also need to revise its current 
peace plan, because it includes stipulations that are not realistic for the logistics of a new 
government in which the Taliban and officials of the current Afghan government are both 
involved.   
 As highlighted above, if the Taliban gains control over religious aspects of the 
government and society, it will be the end of any power sharing. The Taliban aims to rebuild the 
Islamic Emirate using its radicalized form of Islam. The entire country would have the 
foundation of its religion determined by the Taliban, which would mean the entire population 
would be required to follow strict rules. This would lead to the rapid decrease of the prevalence 
of women in positions of authority and public facing roles of any kind and the world would see 
Afghanistan revert to the government system it had twenty years ago. The Afghan army is not 
powerful enough to fight the Taliban on its own, so the US needs to stay in Afghanistan until a 
successful agreement can be reached. If not, the Taliban will take over. 
 In an ideal resolution in which the Afghan government could keep its power and integrate 
Taliban leadership into some official positions, US troops would eventually be withdrawn from 
the country. The American civilian population no longer seems to provide active support for a 
continuation of war in Afghanistan, with three-fourths of the adult population that were polled in 
August 2020 stating that they want to see the US government bring the US troops home.143 The 
media coverage of the situation has significantly decreased in the past six years, which is likely a 
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result of US citizens becoming apathetic about the war because of its length and the country’s 
constant influence in the Middle East. Nevertheless, there is another primary motivation for US 
troops to remain in Afghanistan for the time being. If the Taliban and its Haqqani Network and 
Al-Qaeda affiliates gain control over the government in Afghanistan, it is going to give Al-
Qaeda more resources with which to attack the US.144 General McKenzie, the acting commander 
of US forces in the Middle East, and the Central Command predict that Al-Qaeda could have the 
ability to launch another major attack on the US in about three years.145 Al-Qaeda has been 
laying low in Afghanistan and has not conducted a large-scale attack in years. Since its 
leadership is intertwined with that of the Taliban and Haqqani Network, it has most likely been a 
co-conspirator in attacks that the other two groups have recently executed. However, if the 
Taliban is able to reestablish the Islamic Emirate as it hopes, Al-Qaeda will become an imminent 
threat to the safety of the US.  
 In addition, the Islamic State (IS) could return to Afghanistan if the Taliban gain control 
of the government. In March 2019 IS had as many as 16,000 fighters in Iraq and Syria, and it 
could easily spread its influence to Afghanistan if given the chance.146 Although IS has not 
launched any significant attacks in the country in several years, it is very active in surrounding 
countries and still has fighters in Afghanistan who would seize the opportunity to join the group 
again.147 This is another major threat that the Biden Administration needs to consider, because if 
the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Al-Qaeda, and Islamic State collaborate on attacks in 
Afghanistan, it will be incredibly difficult to stop or negotiate further with them. 
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Limitations of this Study 
 A main limitation of this thesis is that there is no way to know if the Taliban, Haqqani 
Network, and Al-Qaeda are ever going to complete negotiations under any circumstances. I have 
recommended the best policy decision for the Biden Administration based on this research, but 
the three terrorist groups may never cooperate, and the US and Afghan governments will no 
longer be looking at how to navigate negotiations, but whether or not it is worthwhile to continue 
the war. At this point in the negotiations, the Taliban will not agree to anything or compromise 
with President Ghani, and it seems that a continuation of the war may be the near future. If that is 
the case, the US will need to send troops back to Afghanistan, and it may anger the American 
public. However, if the Biden Administration is able to rally American citizens to support a 
longer war in Afghanistan once the public learns of the increased attacks by the Taliban, the US 
troops will have more support from the country.  
 Another limitation is the availability of information of attacks conducted from 2020-
present. Since they are not recorded in any database, the news reports are the best sources for 
accounts of attacks in the past year and a half. Once databases such as the GTD create entries for 
all the attacks, it will be easier to see the ways in which the three terrorist groups have been using 
the attacks to communicate and all the targets they chose to do so. It will also be interesting to 
see how the three groups continue to aid each other throughout the process and if the Taliban 
will continue receiving large amounts of support from the other two.  
 Finally, the involvement of US forces and the need for a physical US presence in 
Afghanistan is a major limitation of the Biden Administration’s options. The way in which the 
peace plan options are laid out in chapter three make them seem clear-cut and straightforward. In 
reality, there is so much overlap between the policy goals of the US and Afghan governments 
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that may keep the US and Afghan governments from arriving at a possible plan for quite some 
time. The US does not want to lose credibility by leaving the conflict, therefore undoing all its 
accomplishments in Afghanistan over the past twenty years, but it wants to be able to bring its 
soldiers home. The Afghan government requires physical support from the US government for 
the peace negotiations to be effective, but if US forces stay in the country much longer, there is 
no known timeline for when those soldiers could come home or when Afghanistan could be 
independent.  
Future Research 
 While moving forward in negotiations, it is necessary for the Biden Administration to 
consider the reactions from the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Al-Qaeda when choosing a plan. 
The US does not want to let Afghanistan fall victim to the Islamic Emirate, and its presence in 
the country could prevent terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda from gaining enough power to launch 
large attacks. Future research should monitor the actions of the three terrorist groups to 
determine if they are serious in reaching any kind of agreement with the Afghan government. 
Right now, it seems as though the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Al-Qaeda are not willing to 
share any power. Their stance on ruling with current officials of the government is unlikely to 
change, but if the US brings more troops back into the country, they may change their minds. 
This could dramatically affect the trajectory of the negotiations. 
 Subsequent research should also focus on tracking the change in attack targets by the 
three terrorist groups. This thesis has explained what it means for them to be targeting 
government forces at this time, but if the targets change, it will be important to understand why 
and use that information to predict the outlook and plans the Taliban and its affiliates have for 
negotiations. There are many unknowns involved in the logistics of the peace negotiations, but 
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details such as the reactions of the terrorist groups and the type of targets they are attacking will 
aid the US in finding the best solution to the peace negotiations, even if it seems there is not an 
ideal outcome currently available.  
 On April 13th, 2021, President Biden announced that the US is going to withdraw its 
troops from Afghanistan by September 11th, 2021. His military advisors recommended that the 
administration keep forces in the country as long as possible to show the Taliban that it is not 
going to leave the Afghan government with no support, but this extension from May 2021 to 
September 2021 demonstrates the US government’s further dedication to helping the Afghan 
government navigate the negotiations.148 The Biden Administration could have chosen to 
withdraw troops sooner, and this decision shows that it is possible the Biden Administration 
could extend the stay of US troops once again later this year. Additionally, on April 12th, 2021, 
the Taliban revealed that it is backing out of the next round of the peace negotiations that were 
supposed to take place in Turkey beginning in April 2021.149 The group stated its reason was that 
it needs more time to consult between its leadership about its next steps.150 The Biden 
Administration announcing the withdrawal of troops a day later on the anniversary of the attacks 
on the World Trade Centers, Pennsylvania, and Washington D.C. is no coincidence. It seems as 
though the extension is meant to show the Taliban that the US is still very invested in the 
outcome of the negotiations and that the US government and citizens will never forget the past 
attacks conducted in the country. Future research on the peace negotiations should track the 
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